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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JODY DALE PARKE, : Case No. 20070840-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Officer Anderson's frisk was not based on reasonable suspicion that Parke was 
armed and presently dangerous. The totality of the circumstances shows that Officer 
Anderson could have safely observed and questioned Parke in order to substantiate or 
dispel his suspicions, but he chose not to. Instead, even though Parke had readily 
complied with all of his orders and Parke's hands were outside the vehicle where he 
could see them, Officer Anderson immediately frisked Parke. Thus, this Court should 
hold that the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FRISK VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE 
IT WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
The totality of the circumstances in this case did not create a reasonable suspicion 
that Parke was '"armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, [^13, 78 P.3d 590 (citation omitted). First, the inherent danger in all 
traffic stops did not create a reasonable suspicion that justified the frisk in this case. See 
infra at Part A. This is especially true since the stop was for a minor traffic violation and 
questioning Parke while his hands were outside the window or ordering him from the 
vehicle would have mitigated any potential danger. See id. Second, nothing about the 
time or place of the stop suggested that Parke was armed and presently dangerous. See 
infra at Part B. Third, Parke's shoulder movement and compliant (but somewhat 
agitated) demeanor during the stop did not create a reasonable suspicion that he was 
armed and presently dangerous. See infra at Part C. 
A. The Inherent Danger In All Traffic Stops Did Not Create a Reasonable 
Suspicion that Justified the Frisk, Especially Since the Stop Was For a Minor 
Traffic Violation and Questioning Parke or Ordering Him Out of the Vehicle 
Would Have Mitigated Any Potential Danger. 
Parke does not dispute "that there are inherent safety concerns in all traffic stops." 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at <fl23 (citation omitted). "[0]fficers facc a n inordinate risk when 
approaching a person seated in an automobile." IcL (citing Michigan v. LonR, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1048 (1983)). "Due to this inherent dangerousness, courts allow officers to take 
certain precautions to protect themselves without having to justify their actions based on 
reasonable suspicion." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at [^24. These precautions include "ordering 
a person out of a car or conducting background checks," but do not include Terry frisks. 
Id. at [^25 (citations omitted). A Terry frisk "is an intrusion of a greater magnitude" and 
may only be performed when the officer "reasonably believes [thej person is 'armed and 
2 
presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" Id. at [^13 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1,24(1968)). 
When evaluating the reasonableness of a frisk, "the inherent dangerousness of all 
traffic stops is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis." 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at l|f22. When considering this factor, however, a court must also 
consider its flipside: The danger inherent in a traffic stop "can be fully or partially 
mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle." Id at !fl[22, 27; see Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) ("Outside the car, the passengers will be denied access 
to any possible weapon . . ."); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) 
("Establishing a face-to-face confrontation . . . reduces the likelihood that the officer will 
be the victim of an assault."). Thus, in Warren, our supreme court held that "both the 
inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop and any reduction in that danger resulting from 
ordering the occupants out of the vehicle should be factored into the totality of the 
circumstances analysis." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^22 (emphasis added). 
In Long, the United States Supreme Court held that officers are not required "to 
adopt alternate measures to avoid a legitimate Terry-type intrusion. Long, 463 U.S. at 
1052 n.16. Ordering a person from his vehicle, however, is not an "alternate means to 
ensure" the officer's safety. Id, at 1052; see Aple. Br. at 20. To the contrary, it is a 
necessary precursor to the Terry frisk: "To perform a Terry frisk, an officer must order 
the occupants from the vehicle." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^|27. Likewise, observing and 
questioning a person in order to assess whether the person is armed and presently 
dangerous is not an "alternate means to ensure" the officer's safety. Long, 463 U.S. at 
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1052. Rather, it is an essential part of the officer's "duty." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 
661, 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
If officers sense danger, then they can order a person out of the vehicle. See 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at *|j24 (citations omitted). Once the person is out of the vehicle, 
officers have a duty to assess whether the facts at that moment warrant a frisk. See id. at 
|^14 ("To determine reasonableness, a court should question whether 'the facts available 
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.'" (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added)). In all cases, especially "simple traffic stop[s]," the officers' 
assessment should include that the danger was "fully or partially mitigated by ordering 
the occupants out of the vehicle." Id. at 1fl|22, 27. Then, if "[circumstances allow[] the 
officers time to reassess . . . their initial suspicions of danger without being subjected to 
'unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties,'" the officers should resolve their 
suspicions "by questioning [the] defendant." White, 856 P.2d at 666 (citing Terry, 392 
U.S. at 23). 
The State concedes that the stop involved in this case was a simple traffic stop and 
"not the kind of offense which by its very nature gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
the suspect was armed and dangerous." Aple. Br. at 8 (citation omitted). As explained 
below and in the opening brief, this stop contained few, if any, "other indicia of 
dangcrousness." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at j^27. Thus, ordering Parke out of the vehicle 
"clearly mitigate[dj the inherent dangerousness of the stop." Id.; see Aplt. Br. at 14-26. 
4 
R The Time and Place of the Stop Did Not Create Any Reasonable Suspicion 
that Parke Was Armed and Presently Dangerous. 
As explained by the State, "Officer Anderson's characterization of the area [he 
patrols] as 'very dangerous' came without qualification, suggesting that the area is 
generally dangerous regardless of the time." Aple. Br. at 11. This is precisely the 
problem. 
An officer may not justify a frisk by broadly declaring that the entire area he 
patrols is dangerous at all times of day and night. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^33 
(holding "credence should not be given to hunches, but to specific reasonable inferences . 
. ." (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)). This is especially true when that area includes a 
popular movie theater. R. 41. This amounts to no more that an '"inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^14 (citations omitted); 
see Aple. Br. at 11 (conceding that "there may be times when the area is more, or less, 
dangerous than at other times"). Rather, to justify a frisk, the "officer must be able to 
point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. at ^14 (citation omitted). 
Officer Anderson provided none of the specific facts necessary to legitimize his 
broad assertion that the entire area he patrols is "very dangerous" at all times of day and 
night. R. 41. At 9:30 pm, many people will be driving through the area that Officer 
Anderson patrols for any number of innocuous reasons—going to or coming from a 
movie, going home from work, getting groceries, or running errands. And any of these 
people might stop for gas. To assume that all these people "carry weapons or are 
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otherwise dangerous," Aple. Br. at 11, and then frisk them if they move their shoulder is 
to proceed on an '"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Warren, 2003 
UT 36 at f^l4 (citations omitted). 
Worse, allowing such a frisk would make frisks automatic in virtually every traffic 
stop for a minor traffic violation in Officer Anderson's undefined patrol area, regardless 
of the time or other circumstances. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) ("the 
'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than 
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked."); Warren, 2003 UT 36 
at *p4 (holding officer must demonstrate the need to frisk by "pointing] to specific facts 
which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the 
intrusion" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)); People v. Cassel, 100 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1972) (holding fast hand movement did not justify frisk because allowing 
officers to "routinely search for weapons in all such instances would . . . constitute an 
'intolerable and unreasonable' intrusion into the privacy of the vast majority of peaceable 
citizens who travel by automobile"); People v. Moray, 35 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1963) (holding if "arm motion" during stop constituted "probable cause" to search 
"then practically every motorist in California who receives or is about to receive a traffic 
citation will be subject to having his person and his automobile searched by the traffic 
officer—such is fortunately not the law"); cf. State v. White, 856 P.2d at 656, 665 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (declining to validate "automatic frisk based on [suspectcdj . . . cocaine 
use" because cocaine use "is not a crime of violence comparable to dealing in large 
quantities of drugs"). 
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C. When Viewed Within the Totality of the Circumstances, Parke's Shoulder 
Movement and Demeanor During the Stop Did Not Create a Reasonable 
Suspicion that He Was Armed and Presently Dangerous, 
First, an officer is not permitted to frisk a person based on a mere "inference" that 
the person '"may be armed and presently dangerous.'" Aple. Br. at 13 (citations 
omitted). To the contrary, an officer "may perform a protective frisk" only when he 
"reasonably believes [the] person is 'armed and presently dangerous to the officer or 
others/" Warren, 2003 UT 36 at *f 13. When "determining reasonableness, 'due weight 
must be given, not to |an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," 
but to specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the [nets 
in light of his experience.'" Id. at ^14 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, 
the question in this case is not whether Officer Anderson could infer from Parke's 
movements that he was concealing "either a weapon or narcotics." Aple. Br. at 13. 
Rather, the question is whether Officer Anderson identified specific reasonable 
inferences that entitled him to reasonably believe Parke was armed and presently 
dangerous. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ffi[13-14. 
Second, a person's movements are not "furtive" simply because an officer says 
they are. Aple. Br. at 13; sec Warren, 2003 UT 36 at p 3 ; State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 
511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("*[F]rom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture 
can often be mistaken for a guilty movement.'" (citations omitted)). This is true even if 
the officer has special training and experience. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at p 3 
(disregarding "officer's entitlement to draw upon his or her experience," where "the facts 
leading to [officer's] suspicion are too attenuated to justify the inference"). Rather, the 
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reasonableness of a frisk is "evaluated objectively according to the totality of the 
circumstances." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at f^l4 (citations omitted). While an "officer's 
subjective belief may be a factor in the objective analysis," "the officer must be able to 
point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. (citation omitted). 
Thus, in State v. Schlosscr, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), our supreme court's 
determination that the defendant's movements were innocuous did not hinge on the 
officer's failure to cite "safety concerns as the basis for his actions." Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
at 1137 (citations omitted). The court acknowledged the officer's subjective belief as a 
factor in its analysis. See id. But the bulk of its analysis focused on the defendant's 
actual movements. Id. at 1138. The officer saw the defendant (a passenger) "bending 
forward, acting fidgety, turning to the left and to the right, and turning back 1o look at the 
officer" as the vehicle stopped and "continu[ingJ to move about in the cab" as he spoke to 
the driver outside the vehicle. Id. at 1133-34. Our supreme court determined these 
movements were innocuous because: 
[Defendant] may have been attempting to locate a driver's license. He could have 
been preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down the volume on 
the radio or extinguishing a cigarette. He may also have been putting away food 
and beverages, changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking brake or doing a 
host of other innocuous things. When confronted with a traffic stop, it is not 
uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn 
to look at an approaching police officer. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 184 
(Utah 1987). A search based on such common gestures and movements is a mere 
"hunch," not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 
Id at 1138. 
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Similarly, in White, this Court's determination that the defendant's movements 
were innocuous did not hinge on the officer's statement that his "observation of 
defendant while in the vehicle and while exiting it gave 'no indication that [defendant] 
was armed/" White, 856 P.2d at 658 (alteration in original). Although this Court 
mentioned the officer's subjective belief in its statement of the case's background, its 
analysis focused on the defendant's actual movements. Id. at 661. "In reviewing the 
record, we note | the officer's] testimony that his observation of defendant prior to 
meeting him was limited to seeing 'defendant [] kind of leaning off to his side a little 
bit.'" Id This gesture "was innocuous." Id; see also Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^33 
(holding frisk not justified because officer's "suspicions of drug activity or prostitution 
[were] better classified as hunches," defendant's "cooperativeness, denial of being armed, 
and the absence of alarming actions further negate[d] the reasonableness argument," 
officer "testified repeatedly that he did not have any reason to believe that [defendant] 
was armed and dangerous," and officer's "removal of [defendant] from the vehicle 
decreased the inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop"). 
In this case, Officer Anderson saw Parke move his shoulder. R. 41. Subjectively, 
he believed the movement might indicate that Parke was "reaching towards [the] 
waistband area" and, based on his "past experiences," believed that people making "those 
movements" are "concealing either weapons or narcotics." R. 41-42. But Officer 
Anderson is an officer trained to expect danger and likely "approached the scene with a 
preconceived notion—consciously or subconsciously—of what gestures he expected to 
see and what he expected them to mean." Holmes, 774 P.2d at 511 (citation omitted). 
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Further, "[wjhile respecting an officer's entitlement to draw upon his or her 
experience, the facts leading to Officer [Anderson's | suspicion are too attenuated to 
justify the inference." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^33. Without more information, a 
shoulder movement is innocuous. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138 (holding "'movements, 
turning to the left and to the right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to 
look at the officer, do not, without more, show a reasonable possibility that criminal 
conduct has occurred or is about to occur"); White, 856 P.2d at 661. As conceded by the 
State, a number of "innocent explanations" exist for Parke's movement. Aple. Br. at 13. 
As is common "for drivers and passengers alike," Parke could have been "attempting to 
locate a driver's license," "preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down 
the volume on the radio or extinguishing a cigarette," "putting away food and beverages," 
"putting on the parking brake or doing a host of other innocuous things." Schlosser, 774 
P.2d at 1138 (citation omitted). 
Besides, Officer Anderson's subjective viewpoint is just one factor in the 
reasonableness analysis. S^e Warren, 2003 UT 36 at [^14; State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 
115,1|15, 182 P.3d 935. The remainder of the circumstances belies his belief and shows 
that a frisk was not justified because questioning Parke while his hands were outside the 
window and/or ordering him from the vehicle would have "mitigate[d] the inherent 
dangerousness of the stop." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^|27. Although it was dark outside, 
Parke was driving in an area of town used by all citizens; he was stopped for a minor 
traffic violation; he readily obeyed the signal to stop; he was alone in the vehicle; he was 
stopped at 9:30 pm in a popular movie theater parking lot (a time when the parking lot 
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was presumably lit and populated with movie-goers); and Officer Anderson was a trained 
and armed police officer and was accompanied by a trained and armed backup officer. R. 
41-43; 122:4-5. 
True, Parke became "somewhat agitated" when Officer Anderson ordered him to 
put his hands out the window and questioned the order, but he readily complied and did 
not move to replace his hands in the vehicle or otherwise disobey the order, R. 42. 
While not ideal, this reaction did not invoke suspicion that he was armed and presently 
dangerous. It did not involve "loud and boisterous behavior." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 
^33 (listing "loud and boisterous behavior" as an "obvious articulable factfj that would 
make the [reasonableness] determination easier"). Nor did it involve "unprovoked flight" 
or other "evasive behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (listing 
"unprovoked flight upon noticing the police" and other "nervous, evasive behavior"" as 
"a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" (citations omitted)). Rather, as 
explained in the opening brief, it was one of several natural responses a person might 
have when he is stopped for a minor traffic violation and is suddenly ordered to put his 
hands outside the vehicle. SQQ Aplt. Br. at 22. 
In sum, a frisk "'is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and should 
not be taken lightly." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^13 (citation omitted). Rather, it must be 
based on "'specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the 
facts in light of his experience.'" Id. at ^14 (citation omitted). In this case, Officer 
Anderson's frisk was not based on reasonable suspicion that Parke was armed and 
presently dangerous. See Aplt. Br. at 12-26. The totality of the circumstances shows that 
11 
he could have safely observed and questioned Parke in order to substantiate or dispel his 
suspicions, but he chose not to. R. 38-51. Instead, even though Parke had readily 
complied with all of his orders and Parke's hands were outside the vehicle wrhere he 
could see them, Officer Anderson immediately frisked Parke. R. 38-51. Thus, this Court 
should hold that the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Parke's conviction because the trial court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
SUBMITTED this _ [ ] _ day of September, 2008. 
&\*~ Q ' ^ T 3 ^ 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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